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We investigate institutional and policy drivers of telecommunications deregulation in Europe. In 
particular, we focus on those determinants which received so-far a comparatively little attention: 
policy speed and timing, path-dependency, institutional complementarity. We find that: first, cross-
effects from privatizations to liberalizations reveal to affect the liberalization process; second, the 
telecommunications industry is shown to play a ‘pivotal role’ in the liberalization patterns of European 
countries; third, ‘path dependency’ turns out to be a crucial driver for telecommunications’ 
liberalizations; fourth, liberalizations in telecommunications result to be linked across European 
countries; fifth, ‘institutional complementarities’ between liberalization initiatives and regulatory 
authorities are shown to significantly shape the telecommunications market structure. Finally, we 
interpret our findings in light of the evolution of the European regulatory framework and suggest that 
these results may represent important lessons for policy design in other network industries. 
Keywords 
Telecommunications, liberalizations, competition, panel regression. 




A growing diffusion of market-oriented policies in OECD countries has been observed over the 
last thirty years (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). There is nowadays a wide consensus that a clear 
paradigm shift occurred from state-owned firms managing natural monopolies to the ‘regulatory 
state’ promoting competitive markets (Gilardi, 2002; Levi-Faur, 2005) and that 
telecommunications played a pivotal role in driving policy reforms in other network industries.  
The last release of OECD’s indicators of entry barriers reduction (OECD, 2009) shows that, 
in the telecommunications sector, European countries are on average aligned towards the 
highest value of the indicator measuring market openness. Thus, according to these indicators, 
telecommunications liberalization in Europe represents a successful story, approaching its end.  
Despite the wide empirical literature devoted to the issue, a comprehensive analysis aimed at 
disentangling the institutional features which affected the observed deregulation processes, is 
still in its infancy. Several dimensions of the deregulation process still need to be ascertained. 
Policy issues like timing and sequencing, path dependency and institutional complementarity 
are far from being fully measured and assessed. We believe that understanding the role of such 
neglected determinants of deregulation is crucial, not only for the the appraisal of the evolution 
of telecommunications sector, but also for the lessons that we could derive for deregulating 
other network industries.  
The vast array of available empirical analyses confirms each, some specific, but certainly 
nonexhaustive features of the many determinants of telecommunications deregulation: the 
economic rationale behind the dis-integration of natural monopolies and the introduction of 
downstream competition through nondiscriminatory access to essential facilities (Armstrong 
and Sappington, 2006); the rise of the ‘regulatory state’, as a new institutional model based on 
the removal of barriers to entry, privatization programs, independent regulatory agencies and 
antitrust enforcement (Majone, 1997; Gilardi, 2005; Levi-Faur, 2005; Gual and Trillas, 2006); 
the impact of globalization and Europeanization on policy diffusion (Bartle, 2002; Levi-Faur, 
2003, 2004; Clifton, et al., 2006; Thatcher 2007); the pressure towards internationalization of 
national champions beyond national and European frontiers (Chari and Gupta, 2008; Clifton et 
al., 2010); the role of governmental ideology in promoting privatization (Bortolotti and Pinotti, 
2005; Duso, 2002) and liberalization of network industries (Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010), also 
through a process of growing convergence between right-wing and left-wing liberalization, after 
the so-called second-wave neo-liberalism (Belloc and Nicita, 2011a).  
In this paper we contribute to the empirical literature on the determinants of market-oriented 
policies in European telecommunications, by investigating three dimensions of the deregulation 
process, which have received so-far comparatively little attention: (i) policy timing and 
sequencing; (ii) path dependency; and (iii) institutional complementarity.  
In particular, we perform an econometric analysis on the European countries’ experience, 
analyzing the institutional determinants of telecommunications liberalization in Europe, i.e. of 
those policies aimed at reducing sectoral barriers to entry in the sector we investigate. We use 
data from various sources over the 1975-2007 period, covering 22 countries. 
With reference to policy timing and sequencing, we investigate whether countries followed a 
sequencing strategy in the adoption of market reforms, and, specifically, in the way they 
combine liberalization and privatization policies (Belloc and Nicita, 2011b). Despite they 
received so-far a very limited attention (Bagdadioglu and Cetinkaya, 2007), timing and 
sequencing may matter in terms of the effective degree of market competition they induce (De 
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Fraja, 1991, 1994; Stiglitz, 1999; Newbery 2004;) and thus remain important dimensions of 
liberalization policy to be investigated. Our findings show that timing and sequencing between 
liberalization and privatization reveal to affect the liberalization process, as higher levels of 
privatization induce greater intensity of liberalization. Moreover, our results show that the 
telecommunications industry played a ‘pivotal role’ in the liberalization patterns of European 
countries, as the telecommunications induced liberalization interventions in other network 
industries.  
The second dimension we analyze – policies’ path-dependency – refers to the analysis of the 
intertemporal causality in distinc domains: within the adoption of the same policy over time and 
among a given policy and other market oriented policies. Again, it is interesting to investigate 
the emergence of any path-dependent process between liberalization and privatization within the 
telecommunications sector on the one side, and among this sector and the same policies adopted 
in other network industries. In our view, this is an important issue, in order to ascertain whether 
and to what extent liberalization in telecommunications followed a cumulative or a ‘punctuated’ 
process. Our findings show that ‘path dependency’ turns out to be another relevant driver for 
telecommunications liberalizations, as the actual decision to liberalize explains subsequent 
relative liberalization outcomes in the telecommunications sector. This means that, on average, 
liberalization policies in the sector showed a cumulative continuous process over the years, 
without reversals. Furthermore, our path dependency analysis unveils some systemic features of 
the liberalization process. First, individual countries tend to delay the complete liberalization of 
telecommunications if the other sectors are still far from being fully liberalized. Second, 
liberalizations in telecommunications are linked across European countries, in such a way that 
each country reduces the intensity of its sectoral liberalization in telecommunications, if other 
nations are liberalizing relatively less. 
The third dimension we investigate is the institutional complementarity surrounding 
liberalization policy in European telecommunications. We believe this is a crucial dimension, as 
the emergence of institutional complementarity may show that the outcomes of a certain 
institution/policy are positively related to the presence of another institution/policy (Aoki, 
2001). Again, while the empirical literature on this issue is fairly limited (Gual and Trillas, 
2006; Gual and Jodar-Rosell, 2008), it is important to ascertain under which institutional 
conditions liberalization policies increase their perfomance, relative to other institutional 
constraints. In particular, we have empirically investigated whether liberalization policy and 
regulatory authorities reveal to be institutional complements, enhancing the mechanism of 
competition, measured by pro-competitive changes in the market structure. Gilradi (2002), for 
instance, highlights how regulatory agencies represent one of the main institutional features of 
the regulatory State in Europe. We find that ‘institutional complementarity’ reveals to be 
statistically significant as liberalization initiatives under the presence of regulatory authorities 
have a positive joint effect on the telecommunications market structure, in terms of entrants’ 
market share. Specifically, the presence of regulatory authorities increases the marginal effect of 
the intensity of liberalization interventions on the entrants’ market share. This result unveils 
that, while sectoral liberalizations play a positive effect in shaping the telecommunications’ 
market structure, such effect is likely to be undermined if independent regulatory authorities are 
not yet established, i.e. legal liberalizations alone are not sufficient to fully manifest the 
expected benefits of substantially liberalized markets. 
Our findings reveal that the institutional determinants of the deregulation process we 
investigate play a relevant role and affected the intensity of deregulation process in European 
telecommunications. Our results may shed new lights on our understanding of ‘the market 
deregulation paradigm’, thus providing important guide-lines for other countries and/or other 
network industries, which actually stand behind the deregulation wave observed in the European 
telecommunications sector. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we outline the main stylized facts emerging from 
OECD data, focusing in particular on the pattern of liberalization and entrants’ market share in Deregulating Telecommunications in Europe: Timing, Path-Dependency, and Institutional Complementarities 
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the telecommunications sector, relative to the average value of liberalization in other network 
industries. Section 3 reports our econometric analysis along the three institutional dimensions 
we disentangle. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The liberalization wave in European telecommunications: some stylized facts 
The OECD data (OECD, 2009) show that, over the last decades, the EU’s telecommunications 
sector experienced relatively deeper liberalization interventions, in terms of the reduction of 
barriers to entry, comparatively to other network industries (such as passenger air transport, 
electricity, gas, post, and rail). 
As many scholars have observed, from 1990 to 2000, European countries removed all the 
entry barriers to the telecommunications market, while other sectors still stay behind (Figure 1, 
panel A). On average, telecommunications experienced a relatively faster and deeper 
liberalization wave, as it is clearly outlined by comparing the intensity of the liberalization 
interventions in telecommunications with the average intensity of the liberalization initiatives in 
the other network industries (Figure 1, panel B). Moreover, the observed process of 
liberalization outlines that countries followed a cumulative approach in their policy adoption, 
progressively increasing the intensity of their telecommunications liberalization measures with a 
pick around the end of the Nineties and then reducing the magnitude of the interventions. While 
this may suggest a sort of ‘wait and see’ strategy, no reversals have been observed over time. 
European countries, thus, tended to converge towards full liberalization, probably as the result 
of the EC policy pressure, although some governments launched liberalization before others and 
with different intensity (Figure 2). 
FIGURE 1. Liberalization levels (left panel) and liberalization intensity (right panel) over 
the 1977-2007 period in EU15 (source: elaboration from OECD (2009)). 
      Panel A (liberalization level)       Panel B (liberalization intensity) 
 
Note: liberalization (left panel - Y axis) is measured by subtracting the OECD’s (2009) indicator of entry barriers 
from its maximum value (the liberalization index thus ranges from 0 – minimum liberalization – to 6 – maximum 
liberalization –). The liberalization initiatives’ intensity (right panel - Y axis) is calculated as one-year variations of 
the liberalization index. The network industries’ average comprises six sectors: passenger air transport, 
telecommunications, electricity, gas, post, and rail. Filippo Belloc, Antonio Nicita and Pier Luigi Parcu 
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FIGURE 2. Liberalization intensity over the 1977-2007 period for 22 European countries 
(source: elaboration from OECD (2009)). 
 
Note: the liberalization initiatives’ intensity (Y axis) is calculated as one-year variations of the liberalization index. 
Figure 3 shows the liberalization paths of 22 European countries over the 1977-2007 period. 
This comparative representation of individual countries’ patterns is particularly useful in order 
to outline – from a descriptive point of view – how European nations followed on average a 
similar sequencing in liberalizing the telecommunications industry. While some Northern 
countries did start the liberalization process before the others (this is the case of the United 
Kingdom at the beginning of the Eighties and, to some extent, of Sweden and Finland some 
years later), it is also possible to notice that almost all the countries followed a cumulative 
continuous process over the years, without reversals, completing the entry barriers to market 
reduction by the end of the Nineties.  
The descriptive evidence presented in Figure 3 suggests that, on average, the first 
liberalization interventions in telecommunications were little in terms of intensity, but also that 
all the European countries rapidly increased the magnitude of their reforms after few steps – 
bringing the entry barriers to the telecommunications market below the national network 
industries’ average –, so that liberalizations in telecommunications seem to have played a 
‘drawing role’ in the liberalization patterns of European network sectors. 
Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the evolution of the telecommunications market structure, 
differently from that of the liberalization reforms, presents rather strong differences across 
European nations, with many countries progressively increasing the new entrants’ shares to the 
detriment of the incumbent’s ones and some others (such as Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, 
Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom) even experiencing a reduction of the 
competition level in the last few years.  
The above stylized facts suggest new research questions on some dimensions of European 
telecommunications liberalization which need further investigation. First, we need to ascertain 
whether the decision to liberalize a network industry depends on the individual country’s 
characteristics and how these local conditions affect the pace of liberalization. Second, we still 
need to understand the way in which liberalization measures interact with others reforms (such 
as privatization). Third, we need to investigate the differences between the liberalization 
patterns in telecommunications and in other sectors. In particular we want to investigate whether 
there is any path dependency in the telecommunications liberalizations’ patterns of European Deregulating Telecommunications in Europe: Timing, Path-Dependency, and Institutional Complementarities 
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countries. Fourth, we need to understand why the evolution of the telecommunications market 
structure does not perfectly mirror the liberalization reforms’ pace. We try to give an answer to 
these questions in the following section. 
FIGURE 3. Liberalization patterns in the telecommunications sector, compared with the 
average entrants’ market share in the telecommunications market and with the average 
liberalization levels in seven network industries, over the 1977-2007 period for 22 
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Note: liberalization is measured by subtracting the OECD’s (2009) indicator of entry barriers from its maximum 
value (the liberalization index thus ranges from 0 – minimum liberalization – to 6 – maximum liberalization –). The 
market structure is expresses through an index calculated as a weighted average of the market share of new entrants 
in the trunk telephony market, in the international telephony market, and in the mobile market; we obtain this index 
by subtracting the OECD’s (2009) indicator of incumbent’s share from its maximum value (the market structure 
index we use thus ranges from 0 – minimum entrants’ share – to 6 – maximum entrants’ share –). The network 
industries’ average comprises six sectors: passenger air transport, telecommunications, electricity, gas, post, and rail. Filippo Belloc, Antonio Nicita and Pier Luigi Parcu 
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3. Three neglected dimensions of liberalization in European telecommunications 
As outlined in the previous section, in the last few decades, especially from the mid-Eighties 
thereafter, European telecommunications experienced a deep wave of liberalization 
interventions. The European Commission’s approach to regulation in telecommunications 
acknowledged this trend, encouraging the promotion of competition rather than maintaining 
natural monopolies in the industry.  
While many dimensions of telecommunications liberalizations have been analyzed by the 
economic literature, the empirical evidence linking the evolution of liberalization policy to its 
institutional determinants (Levy and Spiller, 1996) is still in its enfancy. In this section we 
attempt to fill this gap through the empirical anlysis of three institutional dimensions of 
liberalizations which have received a comparatively little attention so far: policy timing and 
sequencing, path dependency, and institutional complementarity. 
3.1. Policy timing and sequencing 
The issue of policy speed and sequencing has been largely investigated by the literature on the 
optimal design of market-oriented reforms in transition countries (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 
1991; Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Blanchard et al. 1991; Roland, 1994; Dewatripont and Roland, 
1995; Joskow, 1998). Relative to privatization policy, the issues of the proper policy timing and 
sequencing have been referred to the dilemma on whether to privatize before or after economic 
restructuring, or to proceed simultaneously. Moreover, the reform should be gradually 
implemented or should they follow a ‘big bang’ (Wallsten 2001, 2002, 2003, Lipton and Sachs, 
1990; Kirkpatrick et al., 2005)? 
De Fraja (1991, 1994) addresses the trade-off between privatization and liberalization 
policies in network industries. He outlines that privatization may not enhance efficiency in the 
industry, as a full liberalization program would do, with private firms competing against an 
inefficient public owned incumbent. Moreover, he shows that the long run market 
competitiveness and the privatized firm efficiency are highly sensitive to whether privatization 
precedes liberalization or vice versa. In some cases, a liberalization program preceding 
privatization Pareto dominates the opposite sequencing. This theoretical conclusion is further 
acknowledged by Stiglitz (1999) and Newbery (2004). 
With reference to the empirical literature, little of it analyzed the role of sequencing. 
Bagdadioglu and Cetinkaya (2007), analyzing the case of Turkey, summarizes the few empirical 
investigations that have been focused on the telecommunications industry. Wallsten (2001), 
using data concerning 30 African and Latin American countries, concludes that privatization 
positively affects the telecommunications sector only when implemented under a pro-market 
regulation. Fink et al. (2002), analyzing a panel data set from 86 developing countries for the 
period 1985-1999, conclude that it is welfare enhancing to introduce competition either before 
or simultaneously with privatization. On a similar vein, Li and Xu (2004) suggest that in order 
to maintain its desired efficiency outcomes the privatization process should be coupled with 
substantial competition. 
In this section we try to investigate whether and to which it is possible to identify a policy 
sequencing in European telecommunications liberalizations (i.e. the interaction between past 
and present liberalization measures and the interaction between liberalization and others reforms 
– such as privatization – ). In doing so, we also control for socio-economic features of countries 
and for unobservable sector-specific characteristics which may play a role in explaining the 
intensity of liberalization interventions. 
In order to perform the empirical analysis we collect a well-suited data set in which we link 
information on countries’ liberalization and privatization outcomes to socio-economic 
characteristics of countries. We use data from various sources over the 1975-2007 period. The Deregulating Telecommunications in Europe: Timing, Path-Dependency, and Institutional Complementarities 
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base sample we use covers 22 countries.
1 Note that our sample period includes the entire 
liberalization wave observed in European countries in the last three decades until 2007. 
We consider an index of the intensity of liberalization interventions on a one-year basis 
(which we call LiberalizationIntensity in our empirical analysis) as the dependent variable. To 
construct such index, we use the OECD (2009) indicator of entry barriers. The OECD indicator 
of entry barriers is based on the OECD Regulatory Indicators Questionnaire, which collects 
information on the ranking of explicit policy settings (see Conway and Nicoletti (2006)) and 
measures the liberalization levels in seven sectors (passenger air transport, telecommunications, 
electricity, gas, post, rail, and road) through sectoral indicators. The sectoral indicators, 
specifically, measure for each country and sector the strictness of the legal conditions of entry, 
which we interpret as a proxy for sectoral liberalization. We measure liberalization levels by 
subtracting – for each country and sector – the OECD entry barriers index from its maximum 
value (let us call this variable LiberalizationLevel), and then calculate the intensity of sectoral 
liberalization interventions (LiberalizationIntensity) by looking at the one-year differences of 
LiberalizationLevel.
2 
Sectoral liberalizations may be dependent on past deregulation choices, on socio-economic 
characteristics of countries, and on unobservable sector-specific factors. In our analysis we 
consider all these three dimensions.  
First, we model past deregulation choices. In particular, we consider a set of one-year-lagged 
deregulation choices adopted by governments. On the one hand, we consider the 
LiberalizationIntensity variable and the absolute level of sectoral liberalization 
(LiberalizationLevel) at t-1. On the other hand, we include two variables accounting for past 
privatization interventions. Firstly, we consider the absolute level of sectoral privatization 
(PrivatizationLevel) at t-1. To construct such index, we use the OECD’s (2009) indicators of 
public ownership, which measures the public ownership levels through sectoral indicators. The 
sectoral indicators, specifically, measure for each country and sector the extent of public 
ownership in the companies operating in the considered network industries, which we interpret 
as a proxy for sectoral privatization. Secondly, we consider the intensity of the one-year-lagged 
privatization interventions (PrivatizationIntensity) by looking at the one-year differences of 
PrivatizationLevel. Potrafke (2010), among others, suggests that past deregulation initiatives are 
likely to affect subsequent policy interventions. 
Second, as socio-economic characteristics of countries, we consider several variables. We 
consider a legislature-specific indicator of political concentration (Herfindahl), i.e. the sum of 
the squared seat shares of all parties in the governments (source: World Bank, 2008). As 
suggested by Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008), the level political competition, and so the effective 
lawmaking power of the government, is (possibly) relevant to the executive’s capacity to 
implement economic policies. We also include a vector of socio-economic indicators: 
EuMember, i.e. a dummy variable that equals one when the country is a member of the EU, 0 
otherwise (source: authors’ coding); EmplIndustry, i.e. civilian employment in industry as a 
percentage of the total employment in the economy (source: Armingeon et al., 2010); 
Unemployment, i.e. the unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labor force (source: 
Armingeon et al., 2010); OpenEc, i.e. the degree of openness of the economy, measured as total 
trade (sum of import and export) as a percentage of GDP (source: Armingeon et al., 2010); and 
Debt, i.e. the gross government debt (financial liabilities) as a percentage of GDP (source: 
                                                      
1  Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
Note, however, that in the estimation analysis we drop from the sample the Czech Republic’s and Hungary’s 
observations referring to the years of communist dictatorship and those Slovakia’s observations that refer to the 
period before it was declared a sovereign state. 
2  Note that in our empirical analysis we do not use data on the road sector, as, for such sector, information on 
privatization levels (that we consider as one of the covariates) are not provided. Filippo Belloc, Antonio Nicita and Pier Luigi Parcu 
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Armingeon  et al., 2010). In this way, we are able to measure the effects of the economic 
characteristics of nations (both those concerning the industrial structure – through EmplIndustry 
and Unemployment – and the central governments’ financial situation – through Debt –), and of 
the countries’ exposure to policy initiatives of other countries and of supranational institutions 
(by using the two variables EuMember and OpenEc). Simmons and Elkins (2005), Dobbin et al. 
(2007), and Pitlik (2007), among others, suggest that domestic liberalization choices may be 
determined by transnational diffusion of public policies. Generally, policy initiatives take time 
to generate an observable economic (or legal) outcome (Potrafke, 2010). For this reason, we 
regress our LiberalizationIntensity variable on one-year-lagged covariates. In this way, we do 
not incur endogeneity or reverse causality problems due to the simultaneous determination of 
liberalization interventions and the given countries’ characteristics. 
Third, to measure the role played unobservable industry-specific factors, we include in our 
model a set of sector fixed effects (by means of sectoral dummy variables, which we call Tlc, 
Electricity,  AirTr,  Gas,  Post, and Rail), which account for the heterogeneity due to 
unobservable sectoral factors (assumed to be both country- and time-invariant). This allows us 
to isolate the effect due to technological unobservable characteristics of each industry. 
Descriptive statistics of the control variables considered in our analysis are provided in Table 
1. 
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable   Obs.  Mean  Min  Max      Source 
     
LiberalizationIntensity  3617 0.155  -0.199  6.000    Authors’ elaboration on OECD (2009) data 
LiberalizationLevel   3730 1.944 0.000 6.000    Authors’ elaboration on OECD (2009) data 
PrivatizationIntensity   3653 0.075  -1.000  6.000    Authors’ elaboration on OECD (2009) data 
PrivatizationLevel   3762 1.453 0.000 6.000    Authors’ elaboration on OECD (2009) data 
Herfindahl   3816 0.291 0.000 0.580    Armingeon et al. (2010) 
EmplIndustry      3564 0.301 0.190 0.453    Armingeon et al. (2010) 
Unemployment    3564 6.694 0.184 24.17    Armingeon et al. (2010) 
OpenEc   3564 80.25 27.81 312.5    Armingeon et al. (2010) 
Debt   3132 59.98 4.638 140.7    Armingeon et al. (2010) 
EuMember   3948 0.338 0.000 1.000    Authors’ own coding  
 
 
      
 
 
Formally, we consider the following cross-country panel model: 
‘LiberalizationIntensity’i,s,t = β0 + β1 ‘LiberalizationIntensity’i,s,t-1 + β2 ‘LiberalizationLevel’i,s,t-1 + 
                                               + β3 ‘PrivatizationIntensity’i,s,t-1 + β4 ‘PrivatizationLevel’i,s,t-1 + 
                                                  + β5 ‘Tlc’s + β6 ‘Electricity’s + β7 ‘AirTr’s  + β8 ‘Gas’s +  
                                                  + β9 ‘Post’s + β10 ‘Rail’s + β11…Z Vi,t-1 + ci + ut + εi,s,t                                (1) 
with t = 1975, 1976, …, 2007, and where V is the vector of socio-economic control variables, c 
and u soak up the heterogeneity due to unobservable country and time factors (they capture, 
respectively, time-invariant country fixed effects and country-invariant time fixed effects), 
parameters from β0 to βZ define the parametric structure, ε are idiosyncratic disturbances that 
change across countries (i), sectors (s), and years (t). We perform a random-effects estimation. 
We also consider a further model specification in which the sector fixed effects are 
interacted with the time fixed effects. Indeed, to assume that technological unobservable 
characteristics of each industry are time invariant – through a set of sectoral dummy variables 
(i.e. Tlc, Electricity, AirTr, Gas, Post, and Rail) – may be too restrictive, while industry effects Deregulating Telecommunications in Europe: Timing, Path-Dependency, and Institutional Complementarities 
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might play a different role, or might even change sign, over time. In order to account for this 
possibility, we estimate a further model where we introduce a set of unobservable sectoral 
factors interacted with a set of time dummy variables identifying each of the three decades 
included in our period coverage (i.e. the time period until 1990, that from 1990 to 2000, and that 
after 2000). As a result, we obtain a set of 6×3 dummies, which we include in place of the 6 
time invariant sectoral dummies. 
The estimation results are reported in Tables 2. We have considered eight panel model 
specifications. Specifications from (I) to (VI) have been obtained by adding one-by-one the 
socio-economic control variables. In specification (VII), the control variables are added all 
together. In specification (VIII), the sectoral dummies are substituted with the interaction terms 
between industry and time dummies.  
The estimated parameters concerning past deregulation choices are broadly stable across 
different model specifications. Models from (I) to (VIII) show several results. First, the one-
year-lagged liberalization intensity (LiberalizationIntensityi,s,t-1) does exert a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the intensity of current liberalization initiatives. Second, the 
intensity of current liberalization initiatives is positively affected also by the absolute level of 
sectoral privatization at t-1 (PrivatizationLeveli,s,t-1), so that the higher is the degree of private 
ownership in the market, the higher will be the intensity of subsequent liberalization campaigns. 
Third, the intensity of one-year-lagged privatizations (PrivatizationIntensityi,s,t-1), instead, seems 
not to affect the intensity of current liberalizations. Fourth, one-year-lagged liberalization’s 
levels (LiberalizationLeveli,s,t-1) negatively affect the liberalization’s intensity, i.e. sectoral 
liberalization interventions proceed at a slow pace when, in the given sector, entry barriers to 
market are already substantially removed. Socio-economic characteristics of countries, at the 
opposite, seem to be less relevant.  
While models from (I) to (VI) show that the degree of political concentration (Herfindahli,t-1) 
and the employment in industry (EmplIndustry i,t-1) do have a negative effect on the 
liberalization’s intensity, and that the unemployment rate (Unemployment i,t-1), the degree of 
openness of the economy (OpenEc i,t-1), the government debt (Debt i,t-1), and the EU membership 
(EuMember i,t-1) a positive one, once all the control variables are included simultaneously (as in 
models (VII) and (VIII)), only EmplIndustry i,t-1  and  EuMember i,t-1 turn out to have a 
statistically significant effect. This is an important result, as it reveals, on the one hand, that 
largely industrialized economies, in terms of number of employees, tend to be object of smaller 
liberalization interventions, and, on the other hand, that the country’s exposure to supranational 
policy initiatives, such as those directed by the EU, acts as a strong positive stimulus for 
liberalization policies. 
 Filippo Belloc, Antonio Nicita and Pier Luigi Parcu 
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TABLE 2. The determinants of sectoral liberalization. 
      I   II    III   IV   V    VI   VII   VIII 


















                        
  LiberalizationIntensityi,s,t-1   0.070  *** 
(0.018)    0.071 *** 
(0.020)    0.066 *** 
(0.020)    0.069 *** 
(0.020)    0.066 *** 
(0.020)    0.077 *** 
(0.018)    0.074 *** 
(0.019)    0.054 *** 
(0.019) 
  LiberalizationLeveli,s,t-1   -0.031  *** 
(0.005)    -0.050 *** 
(0.007)    -0.026 *** 
(0.005)    -0.030 *** 
(0.005)    -0.038 *** 
(0.006)    -0.060 *** 
(0.007)    -0.084 *** 
(0.009)    -0.099 *** 
(0.010) 
  PrivatizationIntensityi,s,t-1   0.053 
(0.037)    0.070 
(0.043)    0.077 * 
(0.045)    0.078 * 
(0.045)    0.065 
(0.045)    0.041 
(0.036)    0.050 




























  PrivatizationLeveli,s,t-1   0.026  *** 
(0.008)    0.028 *** 
(0.008)    0.020 *** 
(0.008)    0.023 *** 
(0.008)    0.028 *** 
(0.009)    0.022 *** 
(0.007)    0.029 *** 
(0.008)    0.034 *** 
(0.009) 
  Herfindahli,t-1   -0.186  * 
(0.105)                  -0.224 * 
(0.124)    -0.164  
(0.123) 
  EmplIndustry i,t-1        -1.739 *** 
(0.253)               -1.143 *** 
(0.275)    -0.655 ** 
(0.283) 
  Unemployment i,t-1          0.005 ** 
(0.002)            -0.002 
(0.003)    -0.000 
(0.003) 
  OpenEc i,t-1            0.001 ** 
(0.000)         -0.000 
(0.000)    -0.000 
(0.000) 
  Debt i,t-1               0.001 *** 
(0.000)      0.000 

































  EuMember i,t-1                  0.242 *** 
(0.036)    0.266 *** 
(0.040)    0.185 *** 
(0.046) 
  Tlcs  
Benchmark  Benchmark  Benchmark  Benchmark  Benchmark  Benchmark   Benchmark   
  AirTrs   -0.019 
(0.042)    -0.023 
(0.042)    -0.032 
(0.043)    -0.027 
(0.043)    -0.043 
(0.047)    -0.010 
(0.041)    -0.020 
(0.046)    
  Rails   -0.092  ** 
(0.040)    -0.128 *** 
(0.040)    -0.107 *** 
(0.040)    -0.103 *** 
(0.040)    -0.133 *** 
(0.045)    -0.139 *** 
(0.041)    -0.207 *** 
(0.048)    
  Electricitys   -0.020 
(0.043)    -0.032 
(0.044)    -0.021 
(0.045)    -0.022 
(0.045)    -0.032 
(0.050)    -0.035 
(0.042)    -0.058 
(0.049)    
  Gass   -0.073  * 
(0.041)    -0.085 ** 
(0.043)    -0.070  
(0.043)    -0.073 * 
(0.043)    -0.091 * 
(0.049)    -0.089 ** 
(0.040)    -0.122 ** 

































  Posts   -0.025 
(0.038)    -0.010 
(0.037)    -0.034 
(0.038)    -0.025 
(0.038)    -0.038 
(0.042)    -0.015 
(0.037)    -0.008 
(0.041)    
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  Tlcs,t (Eighties)   
                     B e n c h m a r k  
  AirTr s,t (Eighties)                         -0.232 *** 
(0.038) 
  Rail s,t (Eighties)                         -0.271 *** 
(0.040) 
  Electricity s,t (Eighties)                         -0.298 *** 
(0.041) 
  Gas s,t (Eighties)                         -0.243 *** 
(0.043) 
  Post s,t (Eighties)                         -0.088 ** 
(0.041) 
  Tlcs,t (Nineties)   
                     B e n c h m a r k  
  AirTr s,t (Nineties)                         0.228 *** 
(0.089) 
  Rail s,t (Nineties)                         -0.218 *** 
(0.073) 
  Electricity s,t (Nineties)                         -0.050 
(0.085) 
  Gas s,t (Nineties)                         -0.277 *** 
(0.057) 
  Post s,t (Nineties)                         0.023 
(0.062) 
  Tlcs,t (Two thousands)   
                     B e n c h m a r k  
  AirTr s,t (Two thousands)                         -0.023 
(0.054) 
  Rail s,t (Two thousands)                         -0.183 ** 
(0.073) 
  Electricity s,t (Two thousands)                         0.193 ** 
(0.077) 






















































  Post s,t (Two thousands)                         0.084 
(0.062) 
   Constant   0.263 *** 
(0.049)    0.753 *** 
(0.100)    0.157 *** 
(0.038)    0.150 *** 
(0.038)    0.151 *** 
(0.045)    0.190 *** 
(0.032)    0.675 *** 
(0.130)    0.558 *** 
(0.132) 
    No.  observations   3426  3151  3151  3151  2817   3458   2805  2805 
   Prob.  >  chi2   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000  0.000 
    R2   0.015  0.031  0.015  0.015  0.021   0.034   0.055  0.087 
Note: * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01 statistical significance. Robust variance estimates.Filippo Belloc, Antonio Nicita and Pier Luigi Parcu 
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Finally, sector specific effects unveil that the unobservable characteristics of the 
telecommunications sector have a positive and statistically significant effect on liberalizations in 
such sector. Indeed, model specification (VII) shows that, being the telecommunications the 
benchmark, all the dummies referring to the other sectors are associated to a negative parameter 
(statistically significant for the rail and gas industries, not statistically significant for the others). 
More specifically, model (VIII) reveals that unobservable industry factors led the 
telecommunications to be more intensively liberalized (relatively to the other sectors) especially 
in the Eighties, corresponding all the interaction terms between industry effects and time effects 
for this decade to negative and statistically significant parameters (note that, again, the 
telecommunications are the benchmark). In the Nineties, differently, the telecommunications 
have been more intensively liberalized only relatively to the gas and rail sectors, while after 
2000 only the rail industry results to be associated to a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient. This finding suggests the ‘pivotal role’ played by the telecommunications industry 
in the liberalization patterns of European countries (Joskow, 1998), where the 
telecommunications seem to have opened up the way for the sectoral liberalization interventions 
of the other network industries. 
Thus, summing up, as the first conclusion of our analysis we obtain a two-fold result 
concerning policy timing and sequencing. First, we observe the existence of cross-effects from 
privatizations to liberalizations in the European network industries deregulation. Second, in 
such deregulation process, the liberalizations of the telecommunications industry appear as force 
underpinning the liberalizations in the other network sectors.  
3.2. Path dependency  
In this section we empirically explore the path of liberalizations in the telecommunications 
sector, looking at its relative course with respect to the other network industries. We are thus 
interested in analyzing whether the wave of deregulation in network industries did follow a 
path-dependent process, affected by initial conditions or whether, instead, it has been 
determined by discontinuous phenomena of ‘stop and go’, in which systemic conditions did not 
play any significant role. 
With respect to the speed and sequencing issue, the analysis of path-dependency of 
deregulation policies outlines the ‘systemic’ conditions which may have favoured or hindered 
the adoption of market-oriented policies. While this issue has been almost neglected in the 
relevant iterature, we claim it allows to understand the extent to which market-oriented policies 
depend on local conditions, in order to assess the probability of success due to policy diffusion 
or ‘transplant’ among sectors and/or countries. 
In this section we then investigate how European countries, on average, achieved the present 
level of market openness in telecommunications. We thus analyze the (possible) path 
dependency of telecommunications’ liberalizations by investigating how and to which extent 
liberalizations in telecommunications were affected by the past deregulation choices of each 
country. 
Figure 4 shows such patterns of relative liberalizations in telecommunications for 22 
European countries over the 1977-2007 period. In particular, Figure 4 displays the relative 
intensity of liberalizations in telecommunications, obtained as the difference – for each country 
and year – between the liberalization’s intensity in telecommunications and the average 
liberalization’s intensity for all the six newtork industries considered in this paper (i.e. 
passenger air transport, telecommunications, electricity, gas, post, and rail). 
Panel A of Figure 4 clearly shows that, over the last three decades, the intensity of 
liberalization interventions in telecommunications tended to be higher than that of the 
liberalizations in the other industries. Only after 2000, as it is shown by panel B of Figure 4, the Deregulating Telecommunications in Europe: Timing, Path-Dependency, and Institutional Complementarities 
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European countries progressively reduced the relative intensity of liberalization initiatives in 
telecommunications, and this is probably due to the fact that entry barriers to market in 
telecommunications were by then almost completely removed in EU nations.  
To investigate path-depndency issues, we perform an econometric analysis, in which we 
model the difference in the intensity of liberalization between telecommunications and the other 
sectors as the dependent variable, and in which we consider the past relative deregulation 
choices as the explanatory regressors. Formally, we estimate a sector-specific panel model. 
FIGURE 4. Relative liberalization intensity in telecommunications over the 1977-2007 

















Let us define: 
(‘LiberalizationIntensity’Tlc,i,t – ‘LiberalizationIntensity’SectoralAverage,i,t ) = ‘SecRelativeLibIntensityTlc’i,t                (i) 
(‘LiberalizationLevel’Tlc,i,t – ‘LiberalizationLevel’ SectoralAverage,i,t ) = ‘SecRelativeLibLevelTlc’i,t                                             (ii) 
(‘PrivatizationIntensity’Tlc,i,t – ‘PrivatizationIntensity’ SectoralAverage,i,t ) = ‘SecRelativePrivIntensityTlc’i,t               (iii) Filippo Belloc, Antonio Nicita and Pier Luigi Parcu 
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(‘PrivatizationLevel’Tlc,i,t – ‘PrivatizationLevel’ SectoralAverage,i,t ) = ‘SecRelativePrivLevelTlc’i,t                                               (iv) 
(‘LiberalizationIntensity’Tlc,i,t – ‘LiberalizationIntensity’EuTlcAverage,t ) = ‘EuRelativeLibIntensityTlc’i,t                     (v) 
where the subscripts Tlc,  SectoralAverage, and EuTlcAverage define, respectively, the 
telecommunications industry (for each country and year), the average over all the network 
industries (for each country and year), and the average of the telecommunications sector over all 
the European countries (for each year). We consider the following model: 
‘SecRelativeLibIntensityTlc’i,t = β0 + β1 ‘SecRelativeLibIntensityTlc’i,t-1 + 
+ β2 ‘SecRelativeLibLevelTlc’i,t-1 +  β3 ‘SecRelativePrivIntensityTlc’i,t-1 + 
+ β4 ‘SecRelativePrivLevelTlc’i,t-1 + β5 ‘EuRelativeLibIntensityTlc’i,t-1 + 
+ ci + ut + εi,t                                                                                                                          (2) 
with t = 1975, 1976, …, 2007, and where c and u soak up the heterogeneity due to unobservable 
country and time factors (they capture, respectively, time-invariant country fixed effects and 
country-invariant time fixed effects), parameters from β0 to β5 define the parametric structure, ε 
are idiosyncratic disturbances that change across countries (i) and years (t). Notice that, in this 
case, we perform a fixed-effects estimation. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.  
TABLE 3. Path dependency in telecommunications’ liberalizations. 
  Dep.Var.: 
SecRelativeLibIntensityTlci,t  
 Coeff.   (Std.Err.)    Stat.Sig. 
              
  SecRelativeLibIntensityTlci,t-1  0.275   (0.112)    ** 
  SecRelativeLibLevelTlci,t-1   -0.242    (0.035)    *** 
  SecRelativePrivIntensityTlci,t-1   -0.055   (0.078)    
  SecRelativePrivLevelTlci,t-1   0.156    (0.037)    *** 
  EuRelativeLibIntensityTlci,t-1   -0.211    (0.107)    * 
 Constant    0.051    (0.027)    * 
              
 No.  observations    560 
 Prob.  >  F   0.000 
 R2    0.099 
Note: * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01 statistical significance. Robust variance estimates. 
Relative liberalizations in telecommunications are shown to be strongly path dependent, since 
past deregulation choices at an industry level do affect in a statistically significant way current 
relative liberalization outcomes of telecommunications. In particular, our estimation results 
unveil several interesting relationships between past and present liberalization initiatives in 
telecommunications. 
First, the one-year-lagged relative intensity of liberalization in telecommunications 
(SecRelativeLibIntensityTlci,t-1) has a positive and statistically significant effect on subsequent 
relative liberalizations in telecommunications. This means that, once a given country has 
implemented relatively more intense liberalizations in telecommunications, it will tend to Deregulating Telecommunications in Europe: Timing, Path-Dependency, and Institutional Complementarities 
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continue to implement deep entry barriers reductions in the given industry until the sectoral 
liberalization process is completed. 
Second – and this is complementary to the first result –, we find that the relative intensity of 
liberalization in telecommunications tends to be reduced when the relative level of liberalization 
in telecommunications (SecRelativeLibLevelTlci,t-1) is high relatively to the other industries. 
Phrased differently, sectoral liberalization interventions in telecommunications proceed at a 
slow pace when the given country has achieved in telecommunications an absolute level of 
liberalization which is much higher than that of the other sectors. This might suggest that 
individual countries tend not to complete liberalizations in telecommunications if the other 
sectors are still far from being fully liberalized.  
Third, the relative intensity of liberalization initiatives in telecommunications seems also to 
be positively associated to the one-year-lagged relative level of privatization 
(SecRelativePrivLevelTlci,t-1), while it is not affected in a statistically significant way by the 
relative intensity of past privatization interventions in telecommunications 
(SecRelativePrivIntensityTlci,t-1). This reveals that, while the intensity of relative liberalization 
and privatization in telecommunications are probably independent, large liberalization 
campaigns in telecommunications are implemented only if the degree of public ownership in the 
market is sufficiently low. 
Fourth, finally, the relative intensity of liberalizations in telecommunications tends to be 
reduced when the given country shows entry barriers levels in telecommunications relatively 
higher than the European average. This result unveils that liberalizations in telecommunications 
are linked across European countries, in such a way that each country reduces the intensity of its 
sectoral liberalization in telecommunications after that it realizes that the other nations are 
liberalizing relatively less. 
In conclusion, hence, sectoral liberalizations in European telecommunications are showed to 
be strongly path dependent both with respect to past within-country deregulation choices and 
with respect to past liberalizations of the other countries. In other terms, the decision to 
implement a certain liberalization intervention in telecommunications does not result from a 
one-period policy setting, but it is likely to be a step of an inter-temporal deregulation patterns 
in which past and present policy decisions are deeply linked to each other. 
3.3. Institutional complementarity and market structure 
Liberalizations in telecommunications played a ‘pivotal role’ in the liberalization patterns of 
European countries, as telecommunications were object of a deeper and faster liberalization 
wave with respect to the other network industries (Joskow, 1998). As we have showed, 
moreover, liberalizations in European telecommunications followed a cumulative continuous 
process over the years, without reversals, with a progressive increase in the intensity of 
liberalization measures until a complete entry barriers to market reduction was reached in 
almost all the European nations. Nonetheless, as we have commented in Section 2, the evolution 
of the telecommunications market structure (i.e. the level of actual competition in the market) 
did not perfectly mirror the liberalization reforms’ pace. Thus, one might ask whether and to 
which extent such a complex liberalization path has actually affected the effective market 
structure of the telecommunications industry in Europe, and whether legal liberalizations alone 
(i.e. without independent regulatory authorities) are sufficient for having substantially 
competitive markets. As Gilardi (2002) shows, indeed, regulatory agencies are a central 
institution in the European regulatory State. 
In this section we try to answer this question. In order to do so, we estimate an econometric 
model in which the variations in the telecommunications’ market structure is expressed as a 
function of past liberalization and privatization choices and in which the presence of a 
regulatory authority is explicitly modeled as one of the covariates. Specifically, we estimate Filippo Belloc, Antonio Nicita and Pier Luigi Parcu 
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both the effect of the liberalization intensity and that of the presence of a regulatory authority – 
taken in isolation – on the telecommunications market structure, while in two further model 
specifications we introduce an interaction term between the two regressors in order to identify 
(possible) complementarities between regulatory authorities and liberalizations.  
Let us define the telecommunications market structure through a composite index which 
expresses a weighted average of the market share of new entrants in the trunk telephony market, 
in the international telephony market, and in the mobile market. This index (that we call 
MrkStructureTlc in our empirical analysis) is provided by OECD (2009). In our analysis we 
consider the one-year differences of MrkStructureTlc as the dependent variable (we call this 
first-differentiated variable ΔMrkStructureTlc). On the other hand, in order to measure the 
presence of a regulatory authority in telecommunications we use a dummy variable that equals 
one when the regulatory authority is in place and 0 otherwise (in order to build this indicator we 
made our own calculation from information provided by Gilardi (2002, 2005); we call this 
variable Authority. 
Formally, we estimate the following sector-specific panel model: 
‘ΔMrkStructureTlc’Tlc,i,t = β0 + β1 ‘LiberalizationIntensity’ Tlc,i,t-1 + β2 ‘LiberalizationLevel’ Tlc,i,t-1 + 
                                                + β3 ‘PrivatizationIntensity’ Tlc,i,t-1 + β4 ‘PrivatizationLevel’ Tlc,i,t-1 + 
                                                    + β5 ‘Authority’ Tlc,i,t-1 + β6 (‘LiberalizationIntensity’ Tlc,i,t-1 × ‘Authority’ Tlc,i,t-1) 
                                                    + β7…K Wi,t-1 + ci + ut + εi,t                                                                          (3) 
with t = 1975, 1976, …, 2007, and where W is a vector of political and institutional control 
variables, c and u soak up the heterogeneity due to unobservable country and time factors (they 
capture, respectively, time-invariant country fixed effects and country-invariant time fixed 
effects), parameters from β0 to βK define the parametric structure, ε  are idiosyncratic 
disturbances that change across countries (i) and years (t). In equation (3), an interaction term 
between the liberalization intensity and the presence of a regulatory authority is explicitly 
modeled as one of the covariates. The subscripts Tlc indicates that each variable refers 
specifically to the telecommunications industry. Again, a fixed-effects estimation is performed. 
In this estimation analysis, the vector W of political and institutional control variables 
includes the following covariates: a legislature-specific indicator of political concentration 
(Herfindahl), a dummy variable that records the EU membership (EuMember), an indicator of 
the degree of openness of the economy (OpenEc), and a political ideology index (Ideology). In 
particular, the variable Ideology is a composite index coded by Potrafke’s (2010), that takes the 
value 1 if the share of governing rightwing parties in terms of seats in the cabinet and in 
parliament is larger than 2/3, 2 if it is between 1/3 and 2/3, and 3 if the share of centre parties is 
50%, or if the left-wing and right-wing parties form a coalition government that is not 
dominated by one side or the other. Symmetrically, the index takes the values 4 and 5 if the left-
wing parties dominate. Consequently, the final Ideology index ranges from 1 to 5, and opposes 
right-dominated governments (when Ideology equals 1) to left-dominated governments (when 
Ideology equals 5). A detailed description of the variables Herfindahl, EuMember, and OpenEc 
is provided above in the paper. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. Deregulating Telecommunications in Europe: Timing, Path-Dependency, and Institutional Complementarities 
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TABLE 4. The role of liberalizations in shpaing the telecommunications market structure. 
    I   II    III   IV   V  
  Dep.Var.:  











              
  LiberalizationIntensityTlc,i,t-1   0.112  *** 
(0.029)      0.007  
(0.022)    0.005 
(0.027)    -0.006 
(0.027) 
  AuthorityTlc,i,t-1      0.221 *** 
(0.028)    0.174 *** 
(0.026)    0.162 ** 
(0.071)    0.131 * 
(0.075) 
  LiberalizationIntensity Tlc,i,t-1 × Authority Tlc,i,t-1           0.115 *** 
(0.039)    0.117 *** 
(0.042)    0.125 *** 
(0.042) 
  LiberalizationLevelTlc,i,t-1             0.000  
(0.012)    0.001  
(0.013) 
  PrivatizationIntensityTlc,i,t-1             0.006  
(0.028)    0.001  
(0.027) 
  PrivatizationLevelTlc,i,t-1             0.002  
(0.015)    -0.007  
(0.014) 
  Ideologyi,t-1               0.016  
(0.012) 
  Herfindahli,t-1               -0.394 ***  
(0.149) 
  OpenEc i,t-1               -0.001 * 
(0.000) 
  EuMember i,t-1               0.101 ** 
(0.048) 
  Constant   0.089 *** 
(0.011)    0.019 *** 
(0.006)    0.021 *** 
(0.006)    0.019 *** 
(0.007)    0.182 * 
(0.093) 
              
  No.  observations   527  544  527  527  522 
 Prob.  >  F   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  R2   0.097  0.126  0.205  0.206  0.211 
Note: * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01 statistical significance. Robust variance estimates. 
Our estimation results suggest very interesting relationships. On the one hand, sectoral 
liberalizations taken in isolation seem to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
telecommunications’ market structure. On the other hand, however, the liberalizations’ effect 
disappears once we control for the presence of the regulatory authority, which in its turn results 
to play a positive and statistically significant role. At the same time, the intensity of sectoral 
liberalization and the presence of the authority are showed to have complementarity effects, 
since the interaction term between the two is associated to a positive and statistically significant 
parameter. This result unveils that, while sectoral liberalizations may play a positive effect in 
shaping the telecommunications’ market structure, such an effect is likely to be very low if 
independent regulatory authorities are not established, i.e. legal liberalizations alone are not 
sufficient for having substantially liberalized markets. Rather, liberalization initiatives and the 
presence of authorities have a joint effect on the telecommunications market structure. 
Specifically, the presence of authorities increases the marginal effect of the intensity of 
liberalization interventions on the market structure; in other terms, liberalization and authorities 
are complementary. 
Further important results are obtained.  
First, estimated parameters reveal that executives’ ideology (Ideologyi,t-1) does not have a 
statistically relevant influence on the market structure resulting from liberalization 
interventions, once the implementation of such interventions is controlled for in the econometric 
estimation. This result is complementary to previous findings showing that political orientation 
of the governing parties shape liberalization policies (see Belloc and Nicita, 2011a); indeed, it Filippo Belloc, Antonio Nicita and Pier Luigi Parcu 
20 
shows that, while political ideology does affect the choice for liberalization reforms (Belloc and 
Nicita, 2011a), it does not affect per se the post-reform competition level. 
Second, we find that the degree of political concentration (Herfindahli,t-1) has a negative 
effect on the market share of new entrants, and that the EU membership (EuMember i,t-1) acts as 
a positive influence on the degree of actual competition in the market. 
Third, finally, we find that the degree of openness of the economy (OpenEc i,t-1) is associated 
to a negative and statistically significant parameter. This might suggest that, while the degree of 
economic openness encourages liberalization reforms (as we have showed above in the paper), 
it also sustains higher concentration levels in the market in response to tighter international 
competition. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have systematically studied the determinants of liberalization policies in 
European telecommunications. In particular, we have empirically investigated three dimensions 
of the deregulation process which have received so-far comparatively little attention: (i) policy 
timing and sequencing; (ii) path dependency; and (iii) institutional complementarity.  
We have found several results. First, cross-effects from privatizations to liberalizations 
reveal to affect the liberalization process, as higher levels of privatization induce greater 
intensity of liberalization. Second, the telecommunications industry is shown to play a ‘pivotal 
role’ in the liberalization patterns of European countries, as the telecommunications induced 
liberalization interventions in other network industries. Third, sectoral ‘path dependency’ turns 
out to be another relevant driver for telecommunications’ liberalizations, as the actual decision 
to liberalize explains subsequent relative liberalization outcomes in the telecommunications 
sector. Fourth, liberalizations in telecommunications result to be linked across European 
countries, as each country reduces the intensity of its sectoral liberalization in 
telecommunications if other nations are liberalizing relatively less. Fifth, finally, also 
‘institutional complementarities’ reveal to be statistically significant, as liberalization initiatives 
under the presence of regulatory authorities are shown to have a positive joint effect on the 
telecommunications market structure, in terms of entrants’ market share (i.e. legal 
liberalizations alone are not sufficient to fully manifest the expected benefits of substantially 
liberalized markets). 
This liberalization process in telecommunications, progressive and convergent among 
European countries, can be rationalized in three phases along the evolution of the EU regulatory 
framework (see Manganelli, 2010).  
A first phase has been that of ‘entry regulation’, characterized by progressive abolition of 
exclusive and special rights (i.e. the pre-requisite for competition development in the market). 
This phase can be referred to the implementation of a list of directives such as: the Terminals 
Directive (88/301/EEC), the Service Directive (90/388) - enlarging liberalization to fixed phone 
added value services -, the Directive 94/46 on satellite communications, the Directive 96/2 on 
Mobile Services, the Directive 95/51 on cable services, and the Directive 96/19 (full 
competition directive) that was the first directive not allowing exclusive rights also on fixed 
phone service. As a result, we have indeed observed a pick in the intensity of the liberalization 
process exactly between the early and the mid Nineties, when most of the directives were 
adopted.  
A second phase moved from formal entry liberalization to substantial pro-competitive 
liberalization. In this phase, under art. 106.3 of the TFEU, in many countries there has been a 
prominent role of competition authorities in the substantial de-regulation, through (a) ‘strict 
interpretation’ in excluding specific anti-competitive conduct from the scope of competition 
law, (b) ‘extensive interpretation’ of liberalization directives and the competition role of Deregulating Telecommunications in Europe: Timing, Path-Dependency, and Institutional Complementarities 
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competition authorities with the objective of enhancing effective competition, and (c) 
‘disapplication’ of anti-competitive national law and regulation under art. 101(1) and art. 102 of 
the TFEU, in combination with art. 4(3) of the TEU and 106(3) of the TFEU. In this phase we 
have observed a substantial change in the telecommunications market structure, characterized 
by an increase in the new entrants’ market share. 
Finally, in a third phase, a new regulatory framework was promoted (with the Framework 
Directive (2002/21/CE (FD)), Access Directive (2002/19/CE (AD)), Authorization Directive 
(2002/20/CE (AD)), and Universal Service Directive (2002/22/CE (USD)), in which the 
competition priciple was ‘internalized’ in the framework, i.e. the regulatory output now depends 
on the actual market dynamics. This  stage of regulation (internalization of competition 
principles) aims at preventing abusive behaviors in the market, not necessarily implying a 
reduction of incumbent market shares. As a result, thus, while the market share of new entrants 
increased following formal liberalizations in the ’80 and ’90, after 2000 the level of new 
entrants’ market shares has remained substantially unchanged in large part of European 
countries, some of them (Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Switzerland and United 
Kingdom) even experiencing a reduction of the new entrants’ market share.  
We believe that our analysis may shed new lights on the understanding of ‘the market 
deregulation paradigm’, in which the evolution of the European regulatory framework results to 
be characterized by important dimensions (concerning policy timing and sequencing, path 
dependency, and institutional complementarity), which surprisingly have received so-far 
comparatively little attention in the existing literature. Therefore, our study provides important 
guide-lines for other countries and/or other network industries, which actually stand behind the 
deregulation wave observed in the European telecommunications sector.  
Moreover, an almost neglected issue in applied research is the question of whether 
liberalization processes, beside reducing barriers to entry for incumbent’s competitors (the 
supply-side of the liberalization) – which has been the almost exclusive focus of the related 
literature –, have also enhanced consumers’ choices, attitude and perception (i.e. the demand-
side). In conclusion, given that almost all European countries have completed the entry barriers 
to market reduction, we thus suggest that for governments it is time to focus on demand-side 
regulatory policies and on the ‘empowerment’ of consumers as new ground for future reforms. 
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Appendix A: OECD’s (2009) indicators of regulatory reforms in telecommunications. 
[Extracted from OECD’s (2009) database] 
Sectoral indicator of regulatory reform: Telecom 




1  Coding of data 
Entry regulation:  1/4            
 
Free entry 
Franchised to 2 or 
more firms 
Franchised to 1 
firm 
What are the legal conditions 
of entry into the trunk 
telephony market?   
1/4*w
t*(1-w
m) 0  3  6 
What are the legal conditions 




m) 0 3  6 
What are the legal conditions 
of entry into the mobile 
market?  
1/2*w
m 0  3  6 
Public ownership:  1/4            
What percentage of shares in 
the PTO are owned by 
government?
2   
1-w
m  % government ownership / 100 * 6 
What percentage of shares in 
the largest firm in the mobile 
telecommunications sector 
are owned by government?   
w
m  % government ownership / 100 * 6 
Market structure:
3  1/4            
What is the market share of 
new entrants in the trunk 
telephony market?   
1/4*w
t*(1-w
m)  6-normalised market share
2 
What is the market share of 
new entrants in the 
international telephony 
market?   
1/4*(1-w
t)(1-w
m) 6-normalised market share 
What is the market share of 
new entrants in the mobile 
market?    
1/2*w
m  6-normalised market share 
Country scores (0-6)  Sjbj Skck answerjk 
1. The weight w
m is the OECD-wide revenue share from mobile telephony in total revenue from trunk, international, and 
mobile. The weight w
t is the OECD-wide revenue share of trunk in total revenue from trunk and international telephony. 
2. "PTO" stands for "Public telecommunications operator". 
3. For the purposes of calculating the indicator the market share of new entrants has been normalised to be between 0 
and 6 with 6 being the smallest market share over all countries and time and 0 being the largest. 
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